Can Civility Return to the Courtroom? Will American Jurors Like It? by Turner, Dennis & Fulero, Solomon
Can Civility Return to the Courtroom?
Will American Jurors Like It?
DENNIS TuRNER*
SOLOMON FuLERO**
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine trials free of objections, with no interruptions for "sidebar"
conferences. The spotlight focuses on the witnesses, not the attorneys, and a
spirit of accommodation rather than contentiousness reigns. Such trials are not
merely figments of the imagination. They occur every day in England.
In the Spring of 1994, 11 had the opportunity to work for several months
with a British barrister, Geoffrey Still, a member of Pump Court Chambers
(London and Winchester). Although I did not have appearance privileges, I
assisted Geoffrey in preparing and conducting criminal trials. Sometimes we
prosecuted and sometimes we defended, but like most barristers, we were in
trial almost every day of every week.
During our first trial, I sensed that although the substantive law and the
rules of evidence were similar, the atmosphere was significantly different. It
was far less combative than American trials.2 The guiding principle was
reasonable accommodation with opposing counsel. 3 Objections were an
endangered species. Heated debate was nonexistent.
I asked myself, "Why?" Some procedural rules differed from those
governing the American criminal trial. For example, there was no voir dire
examination; opposing counsels sat within an ann's length of each other and
were "tethered" to counsel table throughout the trial; defense counsel's opening
speech was deferred until the close of the prosecution's case; the rare objection
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1 Dennis Turner.
2 See MIcHAEL H. GRAHAM, TIGHEING THE REINS OF Jusrtc IN AMERICA 260
(1983). "In the trial of criminal cases in America, counsel for both sides exhibit from jury
selection to jury instruction, an attitude of mortal combat. Every rule of evidence is enforced
to the hilt. Counsel exploit every tactical advantage, whether real or imaginary." Id.
3 "[Barristers do not] seek to obtain temporary victory by unfair means: they remember
that it is their duty to assist the Court in eliciting the trth." Justice Hugh Maddox, An Old
Tradition with a New Mission: The American Inns of Court, 54 ALA. L. REv. 381, 385
(1993). See also Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 443-44 (1992).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
was handled by excusing the jury before discussing the issue; and at the end of
the case the judge summed up the facts in addition to instructing the jury on the
applicable law.4 I speculated that these procedural differences were the primary
reason for the apparent decrease in combativeness.
As I participated in more trials, however, I realized that the civil
atmosphere was more than the sum of the procedural variations. Civility existed
because the barristers were intent on maintaining it.5 They did not justify
combative behavior as being necessary to protect their clients' interests. They
did not attempt to introduce questionable evidence because they could fashion a
"good faith" argument for admission. 6 Barristers saw themselves as filling two
roles: the first as advocates for their clients, and the second as officers of the
court who have a responsibility to keep the trial process free from the taint of
adversarial game playing. 7 After several trials, I realized that trying a case need
not necessarily be a stressful and painful experience. Litigation can be
enjoyable when one is confident opposing counsel will not resort to stratagems
designed more to distort the quest for truth than to aid it. I also knew my
attraction to a more user-friendly courtroom was shared by many of my
4 See GRAHAM, supra note 2, at 229, 237.
5 Another possible motive for maintaining an atmosphere of civility and fair play may be
that barristers are constantly switching roles. Some days they are prosecuting, and some days
they are defending. A barrister would be unwise to be the avenging prosecutor one week
when he or she knows that next week opposing defense counsel may have the opportunity to
assume the avenging role. See id. at 239.
6 See id. at 236.
[U]nlike the defense attorney representing the defendant in America .... the defense
barrister [does not] consider it proper to interject irrelevant matters into the case to
confuse the jury, to require witnesses testifying as to uncontested matters to appear in
court, to object to break the flow of damaging testimony, to turn the trial into an
accusation against the complainant or the police where not called for clearly by the
evidence, or to ask the jury to try the prosecutor, the judge, or society rather than the
accused. Moreover, the defense banister does not consider it his function to attempt to
convince the trier of fact that the accused must be innocent by selling himself and his
relationship with the accused to the jury, to consciously build into the trial error to be
argued on appeal, or to seek with great intensity a hung jury on the theory that a hung
jury is, in most instances, the functional equivalent of an acquittal.
Id. See generally W.W. BOULTON, CONDUCrAND ETIQuEiTE ATTHE BAR (5th ed. 1971).
7 See GRAHAM, supra note 2, at 236. "The English criminal jury trial to a marvelous
extent keeps its eye on the ball-the guilt or innocence of the accused. The trial unfolds as a
search for truth in the same sense that a parent faced with two screaming children goes about
determining who started the fight." Id.
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American colleagues. American attorneys and judges were increasingly critical
about the lack of "civility" in the American courtroom.8 Many believed the
overly combative nature of the American trial affects the quality of justice and
brings the whole legal system into disrepute. 9
Lawyers and judges offer a variety of reasons for the decline in civility.
The overabundance of attorneys is often cited as a cause for increased
competitiveness and a decrease in good manners. Many attorneys point out that
law is now a business driven by the "bottom line," and collegiality does not pay
the rent. Furthermore, they lament that clients do not associate civility with
good lawyering; bad taste, offensive conduct, and obstructive actions are
"qualities" clients want to see in their advocates. 10
Not all lawyers, however, bemoan the loss of civility. There are dissenting
voices to the chorus calling for a return to the "good old days" of polite
litigation. The dissenters suggest that the "good old days" were mostly good for
the "good old boys." 1 For example, women and minorities have a more
favorable view of the rough and tumble world of litigation. Many of them
8 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, Remarks at the Opening
Session of the American Law Institute, in 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971); Interim Report of the
Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371 (1992)
[hereinafter Interim Report]; Catherine Tfr se Clarke, Missed Manners in Courtroom
Deconun, 50 MD. L. REV. 945 (1991); Mark Curriden, Blowing Smoke, 81 A.B.A. J., Oct.
1995, at 56; Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Trth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031 (1975); Arthur Garwin, Disorder in the Court, 81 A.B.A. J., June 1995, at 101;
Geoffrey Hazard, Change Rules to "Civilize" the Profession, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at
13; Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home Rambo: High-Minded Ethics and Low-Down Tactics in
the Courts, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 81 (1991); William A. Martin, Collegiality: You Mean I
Have to Act Like a Hnan Being???, 20 AR. L. REv. 166 (1986).
9 See Interim Report, supra note 8, at 375; The Trouble with Lawyers (ABC television
broadcast, Jan. 2, 1996).
10 See Interim Report, supra note 8, at 393.
11 See Amy R. Mashbum, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 672 (1994) (arguing that "[tlhe rules promulgated by
the 'best men of the bar' are predictably elitist... reflect[ing] the biased assumption that
ethical problems in the bar were coming from new entrants, 'shysters,' ambulance chasers,
and members of the lower classes who were stigmatized as immoral mostly because of their
ethnic background"); see also Andrew R. Herron, Comment, Collegiality, Justice, and the
Public Image: Why One Lawyer's Pleasure is Another's Poison, 44 U. MLAMI L. REV. 807,
833 (1990) (arguing that "a serious image problem might also develop from the so-called 'old
boy' network, if the public were to perceive overly collegial lawyers as colluding and thereby
undermining litigants' rights").
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believe a little bit of incivility is required to break into the "closed shop," 12 and
the change in courtroom manners reflects a change in the distribution of rights
and powers in our society.1 3 They suggest that the lawyer's duty to zealously
represent the client should always trump professional courtesy. 14 These
dissenters would consider a return to the British model of conducting trials a
reversal of the American Revolution and the reimposition of a hide-bound class
system. 15
While the debate over the need for civility and the societal costs of
imposing a civil regime has raged, empirical studies of whether a more civil
atmosphere in the courtroom would appeal to American jurors are nonexistent.
No one has tested, for example, how the typical American jury would react to
the presumably more civil British trial process.16
Would more civility influence jury verdicts? Would civility bore American
jurors who expect the courtroom scene to resemble the "Shoot-out at the O.K.
Corral?" Would jurors interpret an advocate's civility as lack of faith in the
case? These are important questions that need to be addressed before there is
any hope for a civility sea-change. Lawyers will not surrender what they
perceive to be effective, 17 though uncivil, trial techniques in return for winning
12 See Mashburn, supra note 11, at 691-92 (citing a survey which showed that women
and minorities have a more favorable opinion of the legal profession than do college-educated
white males with above average salaries).
13 See id.; see also Herron, supra note 11, at 814-18.
14 See Herron, supra note 11, at 832 (arguing that "because professional courtesy can
have the effect of undermining legal rights, litigants are better served where collegiality is not
available to foil the integrity and honor of loyal representation").
15 See Mashburn, supra note 11, at 695.
A deference-based civility code is essentially aristocratic in nature because it
embodies the upper class's ideal of polite deference to one's civil and political superiors.
Patrician notions of civility are "rooted" in conventions of polite intercourse and
automatic deference associated with the dominance of a patrician elite in English civil
society. It is hardly coincidental that calls for civility resonate with comparisons to a
British system perceived to be a model of decorum and restraint. These favorable
comparisons are ironic because the British system is so bounded by the class origins of
its distinctions among lawyers and the notoriously exclusionary practices of the Inns of
Court.
Id.
16 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 506.
17 Many advocates for civility would argue that "take no prisoners" tactics are not
successful. See Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, 74
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988, at 78 (1988).
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fewer jury verdicts. 18 Our study, described below, attempts to answer those
questions. The study also tries to measure juror reaction to specific procedural
aspects of the British trial that appear to foster a more civil atmosphere.
If. DESCRIPION OF THE STUDY
Three video tape versions of a trial were created which were shown to jury-
eligible adults selected from three different groups: community college students,
university students, and members of the general public. 19 The hypothetical case
used for the trial was developed from a hypothetical case used in prior jury
studies, State v. Tyler, involving allegations of rape at a campus fraternity
party.20 The witnesses in the trial included: (1) the alleged victim, (2) the
defendant, (3) a fraternity brother who observed some of the interaction
between the alleged victim and the defendant, and (4) a medical doctor from the
local rape crisis center.21 Both sides agreed that sexual intercourse occurred.
The critical issue in the case was consent. The defendant claimed, and the
complainant denied, that there was consensual sex.22
The "British version" of the trial was filmed first.23 The roles of counsel
were played by British barristers, and the judge was a British High Court
18 See Mashburn, supra note 11, at 686.
19 Most of the participants were compensated for time spent viewing the tapes and
completing the questionnaire. Psychology students received classroom credit for their
participation.
The Montgomery County Common Pleas Court provided a printout of its jury pool list.
A random group from this list was solicited to participate in the study. In addition to the
official jury pool, other members of the general public were recruited through churches and
other charitable organizations. Each participant could either keep the stipend or donate it to
the charitable organization.
20 The case materials for State v. Tyler were used in previous jury studies by Professor
Steven Penrod of the University of Nebraska. The case was developed by Professor Brian
Cutler from Florida International University and Professor Daniel Linz from the University of
California at Santa Barbara.
21 The witness roles for all three trials were played by four actors from the University of
Dayton Drama Department.
22 This case was selected for two basic reasons. First, the decisive issue is simple, and
its resolution is based on answering the question, "Who do you believe?" Second, although
the issue is simple, emotional elements are present which could potentially affect jurors'
perceptions of the facts, elements which both the prosecutor and defense counsel could
exploit.
2 3 All three trials were filmed in color by a professional film maker, Allen Hueth, who
used four cameras, primarily focused on the attorneys, the witnesses, and the judge.
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Justice.24 The second trial was the "American version." An experienced
American prosecutor and defense attorney acted as counsel, and a Federa;
District Court Judge for the Southern District of Ohio presided.25 The third trial
was conducted by the same American participants, but they did it "British
style." This third version was used as a control to detect reactions to the British
and American styles that might be based on the different personalities, or
accents, of the British and American participants. In none of the three versions
was a verbatim script provided to the attorneys, judges, or witnesses. They all
received a common set of facts, but were instructed to play the roles as they
would in a real case. Although this flexibility lent variety in the way questions
were asked, witnesses were coached to provide the same facts in all three
versions.26 Thus, all three trials produced consistent facts and appeared
authentic.27
Seven specific variations between the American version and the British
version were included in the scripts. These particular procedural and stylistic
differences were selected because the British variants appear to produce a more
24 Guy Boney and Geoffrey Still from Pump Court Chambers played prosecutor and
defense counsel, respectively. Between them, Mr. Boney and Mr. Still have more than 50
years of litigating experience. Sir Charles Mantell acted as judge. Justice Mantell is the
presiding judge for the Western District of England. After Justice Mantel's visit to Dayton,
Ohio, he returned to England and presided at the trial of Rosemary West. The West case was
the British equivalent to the O.J. Simpson case. It involved the murder and torture of ten
young women. He completed the case in a month.
Justice Mantell, Mr. Boney, and Mr. Still have our sincere gratitude for their willingness
to travel to Dayton and devote countless hours preparing for the trial.
Funding for the study was provided by the University of Dayton School of Law, the
University of Dayton Graduate Council, the Dayton Bar Association, the Carl D. Kessler Inn
of Court, and The Montgomery County Trial Lawyers Association.
Special thanks to Dennis Turner's wife, Kathleen Turner, who first suggested comparing
the British trial with the American trial.
25 We would also like to thank Judge Walter Rice, James Cole, who was the prosecutor,
and Dennis Lieberman, who was the defense counsel. Without them this study would not
have been possible. Not only did they try the "American version" of the case, they also tried
the case "British style." Moreover, Judge Rice and his staff graciously permitted us to turn
his courtroom into a production studio for three days.
26 We believe that many of the video trials used in previous jury studies appear stilted
because the participants were following a verbatim script. Furthermore, since our study
focused more on stylistic variations, it was less important that the exact same questions be
asked in exactly the same order.
27 Many of the participants who viewed the trials were surprised to learn that they were
not videotapes of actual cases.
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courteous atmosphere by either creating deterrents to uncivil behavior or
providing incentives for civil conduct.
First, opening statements by the barrister representing the defendant in the
British trial was deferred until the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief. The
American defense counsel gave his opening statement immediately following
the prosecution's opening statement.28
Second, an obviously leading question was asked in the British trial.
Defense counsel did not object. Instead, the matter was handled by counsel
leaning toward the prosecuting barrister and quietly pointing out the leading
nature of the question. The prosecuting attorney immediately altered the form
of the question. In the American trial, defense counsel made an objection to the
leading question and the judge sustained it.29
Third, in the British trial, barristers were not free to move around the
courtroom, but remained at their respective counsel tables, standing only when
speaking at small podiums on their tables. In the American version, counsel
could use the large podium in the center of the courtroom or roam the
courtroom. 30
28 Although this is a fundamental difference between the British and the American
criminal trial, it is not clear how this difference might impact the civility question. The
variation was included as part of the study, however, because barristers' defense strategies are
so closely linked to the delayed opening speech that to change the procedure would have
fundamentally changed the dynamics of the British version.
One can only speculate, but the delayed opening might have a positive impact on civility
by avoiding the game playing that occurs when defense counsel gives an opening that tries to
keep all options open, including the option of putting the defendant on the stand. Room for
that maneuver is unnecessary after the prosecution has put on its case.
29 The resolving of objections as to the form of questions and other relatively minor
evidentiary issues by the barristers without requiring the intervention of the judge reinforces
the impression of civility in the British courtroom. Since most of the objections made during
the course of a trial relate to the form of the question, jurors are not treated to the litanies of
objections that can create a confrontational atmosphere. Furthermore, the culture which
assumes that barristers should settle such minor matters (or be chastised by an irritated judge)
develops a spirit of cooperation and accommodation between the barristers that often carries
over into other aspects of the trial. See EDWARD J. IMWINKmEREm, EvIDaNTLARY
FOUNDATIONS 14 (3d ed. 1995).
30 'Me British limitation on the movement of barristers is conducive to civil behavior
because it de-emphasizes the role of the advocate and limits the barrister's opportunity for
theatrics. The focus of all direct and cross examinations is switched from the barrister to the
witnesses because it is difficult for a juror to focus on both the witness and the barrister at the
same time. In fact, a juror can switch his or her attention from witness to barrister, and visa
versa, only by turning the head. It would be an unusual juror who would not soon tire of
watching the barrister lob a question, pivot to see the witness return a response, only to tm
back to the barrister for the service of the next question. See Jeffrey S. Wolfe, The Effect of
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Fourth, a formal objection was made on a serious evidentiary issue
(character evidence) to the judge in the British trial. After the barrister declared
he had a point of law to raise, the jury was excused while the matter was
discussed and decided. (This was done by creating a brief blank section in the
tape.) On the same issue in the American trial, the matter was handled in front
of the jury.31
Fifth, during the British trial, the judge questioned one of the witnesses; the
American judge did not ask any questions of witnesses. 32
Sixth, in the British case, two questions, one by the prosecutor and one by
defense counsel, were asked which could ultimately lead to the admission of
irrelevant evidence. Before objection was made by opposing counsel, the judge
interrupted the question and asked counsel to move on to another question. In
the American case, opposing counsel objected after the question was asked,
stated grounds for his objection, and the judge sustained the objection.33
Seventh, the judge in the British trial summed up the facts and instructed
the jury on the law. In the American rendition, the judge only instructed the
jury on the applicable law.34
Location in the Courtroom on Jury Perception of Lawyer Peformance, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 731
(1994) [hereinafter, Wolfe, Effect of Location]; Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Toward a Unified Theory of
Courtroom Design Criteria: The Effect of Courtroom Design on Adversarial Interaction, 18
AM. J. TnRAL Anvoc. 593, 606 (1995) [hereinafter, Wolfe, Toward a Unified Theory].
31 The British approach promotes civility because it acts as a strong deterrent to casual
objections cluttering up the trial. Counsel will not risk irritating the jury by forcing them to
retire and then return 10 minutes later only to be excused after 15 minutes for another
objection. Only serious substantive objections are made in open court. This procedure also
eliminates the opportunity for "speaking objections," in which counsel uses the objection as
another tool to influence the jury.
32 Questioning by the British judge has the effect of enhancing civility because it engages
the judge as a neutral participant in the search for truth. Important issues will be addressed
regardless of the questioning strategies of the barristers. Barristers have less incentive to
dodge or obfuscate significant facts. See John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the
Germ= Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IoWA L. REv. 987, 989 (1990).
33 Civility is reinforced by the British judge being proactive in controlling the admission
of evidence. Judicial activism reduces the need for counsel to object and for opposing counsel
to debate the objection. There is less opportunity for counsel to use the objection to make
points with the jury. Also, opposing counsel avoids the problem of appearing, to the jury, like
a roadblock to the mth by keeping out what may be "relevant" evidence. See Daniel Linz
& Steven Penrod, Increasing Attorney Persuasiveness in the Courtroom, 8 LAw & PSYCHOL.
Rnv. 1, 14 (1984); see also Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 429.
34 The judge's summation of the facts promotes civility because it de-emphasizes the
importance of counsel's final argument and serves as a deterrent to theatrical displays
designed to distract and obscure rather than help the jury determine the truth. See id. at 434;
see also Rules of Conduct for Counsel and Judges: A Panel Discussion on English and
Vol. 58:131
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In addition to the specific variations built into the scripts listed above, the
British trial differed from the American trial in other ways. The British
barristers maintained a more detached demeanor than their American cousins.
The British prosecutor gave no hint that he had any personal stake in securing a
conviction, or that he was society's avenging angel. British defense counsel did
not suggest that the whole justice system would be undermined by a guilty
verdict. Polite treatment of witnesses was the norm.
The American attorneys during the American version were more intense
and less concerned with witnesses' feelings. Nevertheless, they were moderate
in their behavior, with no displays of anger or moral outrage. The American
version probably represented a typical criminal trial before a judge who runs a
fairly tight ship.35
The questionnaire used in the study consisted of more than fifty questions.
The majority of the questions were designed to elicit attitudinal responses to
stylistic differences between the British and American versions. They required
the participants to rate the effectiveness of opening statements, closing
arguments, and witness examinations. The participants were also asked to judge
if the attorneys were strong advocates for their clients, and to assess the overall
civility level of the trials.
The remainder of the questions focused on specific procedural differences
between the British and the American trials. For example, participants who
watched the British trial were asked to compare the procedure they observed
with the procedure used in an American trial and to indicate which they would
prefer.
Perhaps one of the most important questions on the survey required the
participant to find the defendant guilty or not guilty. 36 Each participant had to
make this determination without consulting with other participants. 37
American Practices, 7 GEo. J. LFGAL ETiics 865, 879-87 (1994) [hereinafter Rules of
Conduc].
35 It was tempting to stage a rowdy version of an American trial. To compare the British
trial with an O.J. Simpson kind of case, however, though entertaining, would not lead to
credible conclusions. For example, there were thousands of objections and hundreds of side-
bar conferences in the Simpson trial, as contrasted with British criminal trials in which
barristers often make no objections. See O.J. Trivia, Here's All You Need to Know About the
Trial, NAT'LL.J., Oct. 16, 1995, at A5.
36 This question was the first question asked after the typical demographic questions. It
was designed to elicit the participants' visceral reaction to the trial before responses to later
questions colored their judgment.
37 The study was not designed to evaluate the jury's deliberative process. The purpose
was to gauge the typical American juror's reaction to the British criminal trial. We assume
that after deliberation jurors may change their initial positions with respect to guilt or
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IT[. RESULTS
A total of 219 subjects completed the study. Of these, seventy-eight viewed
the American trial version, eighty the British trial version, and sixty-one the
British trial version with the American attorneys. These 219 subjects were
drawn from four populations. The first sample came from a local midwestern
community college and consisted of fifty-eight introductory psychology
students. The second and third samples were from the local private university,
and consisted of twenty-four students from introductory psychology classes and
thirty-one students from criminal justice classes. The final sample came from
the community, and consisted of 106 persons from the Montgomery County
jury pool, churches, and other local groups. The overall demographic
information for the subjects (age, sex, race, political affiliation and orientation,
education, and occupation) is summarized in Table 1. There were no
differences across samples in any of the results, and thus the samples were
collapsed for purposes of analysis. In addition, none of the demographic
variables was significantly related to the verdict.
A. Verdict
A chi-square analysis was performed on the relationship between type of
trial and verdict. These results are summarized in Table 2; as can be seen,
while the overall verdict pattern was fairly evenly split (53.4% Guilty, 46.6%
Not Guilty), the pattern varied by type of trial. With the American attorneys,
regardless of whether the trial was done in American or British style, the
verdict pattern was essentially identical. With the British attorneys, subjects
voted predominantly for Guilty.
B. Perception of Trial and Participants
Subjects were asked, on a seven-point scale ranging from "strongly agree"
to "strongly disagree" (1-7), to rate the perceived fairness and civility in tone
and atmosphere of the trial, as well as whether there were too many
interruptions and objections during the trial. Ratings were analyzed using a one-
way analysis of variance procedure. Individual mean differences between
innocence, but we do not believe such a change would reflect a change in attitude about the
stylistic and procedural differences between the British and American versions.
For a more detailed description of the results, see Soloman Fulero & Dennis Turner,
Using British Trial Procedures in American Cases: A More Civil Trial? (unpublished
manuscript on file with the authors).
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groups were also analyzed using the Tukey HSD procedure.38 These results are
summarized in Table 3. Results indicate that subjects did not differ across type
of trial in their ratings of the fairness of the trial, but that they did find the
British-style trials, using both the British and the American attorneys, to be
more civil and to have fewer interruptions and objections than the American-
style trial. There were no significant differences in perception of the primary
cause of the objections across trial type (i.e., prosecutor, defense attorney, or
both).
Prosecutors and defense attorneys in each of the trial types were rated on a
series of scales measuring dimensions such as their perceived likability,
knowledgeability, persuasiveness, and overall effectiveness. In addition, the
perceived effectiveness of their questioning of each witness and of their opening
and closing arguments was measured. Subjects' perceptions of the fairness,
authoritativeness, knowledgeability, likability, and overall effectiveness of the
judge in each of the trial types were also measured. Each of these variables was
measured on seven-point scales. These results are also summarized in Table 3.
There are few differences in perceptions of the prosecutors and defense
attorneys across groups. However, it can be seen that subjects clearly rated the
British prosecutor as having more effectively questioned the doctor and the
defendant, as having made a more effective closing argument, and as being
more effective overall than the prosecutor in the American and British-style
American versions. Finally, perceptions of the judge on all five variables
(fairness, authoritativeness, knowledgeability, likability, and overall
effectiveness) were more favorable in the two British versions than in the
American version.
C. Opinions on Trial Variations
Subjects were asked their opinions regarding each of the trial variations
employed in the study. Questions explored the placement of the opening
statement, the use of discussions between the attorneys as opposed to
objections, the movement of the attorneys as opposed to standing in one place,
the excusing of the jury after raising points of law as opposed to objections
being made and argued in open court, the role of the judge in asking questions
of witnesses, judicial intervention on evidentiary matters in the absence of
38 The Tukey HSD (honestly significant difference) test is a statistical method for
making pairwise comparisons between groups. Pairwise comparison involves making all
possible comparisons between groups by looking at one pair group at a time. For
example, if there are three groups labeled A, B, and C, then comparisons are made
between groups A and B, groups A and C, and groups B and C. Group A will not be
compared with the combination of groups B and C.
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objections, and summary of the evidence by the judge. Subjects watching the
two British versions were asked if they preferred the variations they saw, and
were also asked about their perception of bias in the summary, as well as
whether they believed it had affected their verdict. Subjects watching the
American version were reminded of what had transpired in the version they
saw, told of the proposed alternative, and asked if they preferred what they had
experienced. These results are summarized in Table 4. As can be seen, subjects
watching all versions expressed a preference for the American-style variations
over those in the British-style trials, with the exception of a preference for the
British-style ability of the judge to question witnesses.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Differences in Verdicts
One of the most important questions addressed by this study was whether
an increase in courtroom civility alters jury verdicts. At first glance, Table 2
suggests that the more civil British trial leads to more guilty verdicts than the
American trial. The conviction rate is seventy-one percent for the British
prosecuting barrister in the British version and only forty-five percent for the
American prosecutor in the American version.39 This apparent variation,
however, must be evaluated in the context of the specific responses in Table 3
concerning the effectiveness of the prosecutor. It is clear that, although the
American prosecutor received positive ratings, the jurors believed the British
prosecuting barrister was significantly better than his American counterpart. He
was rated as more effective in his questioning of witnesses and his final
argument, and jurors thought he was considerably better with respect to his
overall performance.
The jurors' perceptions of the prosecutors were quite different than their
perceptions of the defense counsels. In all three trials (Table 3), jurors rated
counsels for the defense as essentially equal in ability for all phases of the trial
from opening statement to closing argument. No variation in verdicts can be
attributed to differences between defense counsels.
A comparison of the data in Table 3, column 1 (the American trial), with
the data in column 3 (the British trial, using the same American attorneys who
conducted the American trial) explains why the verdicts varied between the
American trial and the British trial with the barristers. When these two versions
of the trial are compared, it is apparent that there is no significant variation in
3 9 If an American prosecutor could "boast" of only a 45 % conviction rate, it is highly
unlikely that the prosecutor would ever be re-elected to the office. See Van Kessel, supra note
3, at 442.
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the verdicts (Table 2). The forty-five percent conviction rate in the American
trial is mirrored by the forty-four percent conviction rate in the British trial with
American attorneys.40 Furthermore, the jurors judged the performances of
prosecutors and defense counsels in both versions as essentially equal (Table 3).
In not one category, from opening statement to closing argument, did the jurors
perceive the prosecutor to be significantly better or worse in the American or
British version. The same phenomenon occurred with respect to the defense
counsel (Table 3). The jurors perceived the ability of the defense counsel in the
American trial and the ability of the American defense counsel in the British
trial to be equal. 41
Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the reason more jurors returned
guilty verdicts in the British barrister trial than in the American version was due
only to the prosecuting barrister's more persuasive performance. The variation
was not caused by the British trial's more civil atmosphere. If increased civility
had been a factor, there would have been significant differences between the
percentage of guilty verdicts in the American trial and the percentage of guilty
verdicts in the British trial using American attorneys.
B. Differences in Civility
Perhaps the most important request in the questionnaire asked the jurors to
respond to the statement, "Overall, the trial was civil in tone and atmosphere"
(Table 3). The jurors who viewed either the British trial with banisters, or the
British trial with American attorneys, concluded that the trials were civil in
tone. In fact, the responses to the civility question for both versions of the trial
were almost identical-3.16 and 3.24. In contrast, the jurors who viewed the
American trial rated it significantly less civil in tone-4.41.
It should be noted, however, that the jurors who saw the American version
did not consider that version to be uncivil. This result was not unexpected. 42
The American version was designed from the beginning to be an example of a
40 In the summer of 1995, Dennis Turner traveled back to Winchester, England, and
showed the American version of the trial to a group of British citizens. They also completed
the same questionnaire used in the study. Although the group was too small to constitute a
valid sample, it is interesting to note that the group split 50-50 between guilty and not guilty
verdicts.
41 This result was expected to some extent because the prosecutor and defense counsel
were played by the same attorneys in both versions. Nevertheless, the similar ratings are
significant in one sense. They reinforce the conclusion that trying a case in a more civil
manner does not reduce one's effectiveness.
42 The British group who viewed the American tape in the summer of 1995 also agreed
that the tone of the American trial was not uncivil.
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courteous American trial.43 The fact that the jurors found all three trials to be
equally fair (Table 3) demonstrates that the American trial's atmosphere was
not particularly contentious. The response to the question about too many
objections (Table 3) also reinforces the conclusion that the American trial was
moderate in tone. Jurors observing the American trial did not agree with the
statement, "There were too many interruptions and objections in the trial." 44
The jurors watching the British versions disagreed more strongly with the
statement. 45
Two additional observations can be made about the above results. First, the
British criminal trial is more civil in its tone than the American criminal trial,
and the enhanced civility is not necessarily linked to the personalities of the
advocates. Although there can be no doubt that the more civil the advocates,
the more civil the trial atmosphere, British trial procedures are still important in
moderating uncivil conduct in the courtroom. When the American attorneys
tried the case British style, the jurors perceived them as much more civil than
the jurors who watched the same attorneys in the American trial (Table 3).46
A second observation also follows from the results: American attorneys can
easily adapt to the British trial practice. The American advocates trying the case
according to British procedure achieved the same level of civility as British
barristers who had spent twenty-five years litigating in the British courts (Table
3).47 This transformation was accomplished with little or no prior training in
British criminal procedure. The American attorneys' first exposure to the
British style was when they watched the British barristers try State v. Tyler
during the first videotaping session.
43 If the degree of civility were measured on a scale from 1 to 10, with "1" representing
the most civility, and assuming the O.J. Simpson trial would receive a "10," the American
trial in the study would probably receive a "2."
44 The score on this question for the American trial was 4.65, suggesting a slight
disagreement with the statement.
45 The score on this question for the British trial with barristers was 5.85, and was 5.31
for the British trial with American attorneys, thus suggesting a stronger disagreement with the
statement.
46 In the American trial the jurors found the tone slightly uncivil (4.41). In the British
trial with the same American attorneys, the jurors found the tone substantially more civil
(3.24).
4 7 The British banisters' civility rating was 3.16 while the American attorneys, when
acting like barristers, achieved a 3.24 rating.
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C. Differences Between Judges
Part of the questionnaire asked jurors to provide their impressions of the
judges (Table 3). The data from that series of questions displayed some
unexpected variations. One would expect to see some variation between a
Federal District Court Judge and a British High Court Justice with respect to
how the jurors perceived the judges' fairness, appeal, and overall effectiveness.
They obviously were two different people (including different accents) coming
from quite different backgrounds. The variation which occurred, however, did
not relate to personalities, but to whether the judges tried the case in the British
style or the American style. Judge Rice and Justice Mantell received statistically
equal ratings when they tried the case using British trial procedure. 48 On the
other hand, the jurors who viewed Judge Rice's performance in the American
trial saw him as less fair, authoritative, knowledgeable, likable, and effective
than the jurors who saw him in the British version.
One could conclude from the above variations that a more civil trial also
enhances the jurors' respect for the judge. There is some logic to this
conclusion. Judges who let trials get out of control will probably be perceived
as less authoritative and less fair. The American version of State v. Tyler,
however, never got out of hand. Judge Rice was in total control of the
proceedings at all times.
A possible explanation for different assessments of the judges could be that
the British judge had more opportunities to play an active role than the
American judge, including summing up the evidence for the jury.49 The
increased activity allows the jury to gain more insight into the judicial
temperament, perhaps leading to a greater appreciation of the judge's role in the
trial.50
48 Both judges were perceived as equally fair, authoritative, knowledgeable, likable, and
effective.
49 One of the British jurors who viewed the American trial commented, "The judge just
sits there and doesn't do anything! What is he getting paid for?"
50The British judge's obligation to sum up the evidence provides an excellent
opportunity to display knowledge, friendliness, and fairness. The summations are often more
like a congenial chat at a neighborhood pub than an austere pronouncement from on high.
One might also suggest that the British judge's summation is more comprehensible to the
average juror than the stilted, boiler-plate instructions on the law often supplied by American
judges. But that must be the subject for another study.
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D. Differences in Procedural Variations
As mentioned above, seven specific procedural variations were scripted
into the three trials, based on the premise that these variations would influence
whether the atmosphere of the courtroom is more or less civil (Table 4). It was
one of the ironies of this study that at the same time the American jurors were
concluding that the British trial was more civil and less combative, the jurors
were also registering their dislike of those aspects of the British trial that
encourage the aura of civility. Only one British procedure, the questioning of
witnesses by the judge, was not disfavored.51
1. Deferral of the Defense's Opening Statement
American jurors clearly preferred to hear defense counsel's opening
statement immediately after the prosecutor completed his opening statement
(Table 4).52 In their narrative responses to questions, jurors said that the
prosecution had an unfair advantage when defense counsel's opening statement
was deferred. The jurors knew only one side of the story at the beginning and
they wanted the "whole story up front." The jurors worried about the defendant
"having an uphill battle" and that a greater burden would be placed on the
defendant to rebut the prosecution's case.53 The fears of a tilted playing field
expressed by many jurors echoes numerous empirical studies which support the
same conclusion. 54
51 It should be emphasized that even with respect to this variation, the jurors did not
indicate a preference for the British approach, only a neutrality.
52 Even the British panel of jurors who viewed the American trial in the summer of 1995
preferred that the defense's opening statement not be delayed. Furthermore, the banisters
who conducted the British trial were intrigued by the idea of the defense's opening statement
coming immediately after the prosecution's opening statement.
53 The jurors suspected that a delayed opening statement by the defense would result in
prejudice against the defendant. This prejudice, however, did not show up in the verdicts. The
percentage of the jurors who found for the defendant was the same in both the American
version and the British version conducted by American attorneys.
One could argue, however, that the prejudicial effect did appear in the British trial
conducted by the barristers, in which jurors overwhelmingly found the defendant guilty. A
very good prosecutor might receive a disproportionate boost from an effective opening that is
not rebutted until much later in the trial.
54 See generally Thomas A. Pyszczynski & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Effects qf
Opening Statements on Mock Jurors' Verdicts in a Simulated Criminal Trial, 11 J. APPUED
Soc. PsYcHoL. 301 (1981); Gary L. Wells et al., The iming of the Defense Opening
Statement: Don't Wait Until the Evidence Is In, 15 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 758 (1985).
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2. Resolution of Minor Evidentiary Issues Without Objections
The British approach to handling many less serious objections by
permitting, or even encouraging, barristers to remonstrate quietly to each other
rather than make a formal objection in open court was also not favored by
American jurors (Table 4). Jurors gave two recurring reasons for their
coolness: (1) their desire to know what evidence was objectionable, and why;
and (2) their belief that it is the judge's responsibility to decide what evidence is
admissible and what is not.55
Although many jurors looked with disfavor on the resolution of minor
evidentiary issues by attorneys without judicial intervention, their rationales do
not support their conclusions. In American trials, jurors learn very little about
the nature of objections that are directed to the form of the question. Often,
only "Objection!" is uttered, which conveys no meaning to the jury.
Furthermore, knowing the nature of an objection is totally unnecessary to the
jurors' fact-finding function. Finally, it is a misconception to believe the judge
needs, or wants, to insert herself in every trivial disagreement which arises
between counsel. 56 Therefore, this British procedural variation could be
encouraged in American trials with little risk of jury alienation. It is simply a
case of "what the jurors don't know cannot alienate them." Jurors would not
hear the attorneys make objections, so the jurors would be unaware that they
were being spared exposure to technical legal maneuvering. 57
55 Another possible reason that jurors do not like the tete--t&es between counsel is their
belief that an adversary system means confrontation. They do not fancy advocates being too
chummy.
56 Efficiency might be another possible reason, not suggested by the jurors, for requiring
attorneys to address all objections to the judge. A one-word objection with an immediate
ruling by the court may take less time than whispered exchanges between counsel. On the
other hand, encouraging counsel to be cooperative on minor issues may foster cooperation in
other matters which would enhance trial efficiencies and would certainly make the trial appear
less contentious.
57 This approach to minor objections may in the long run reduce the number of trivial
objections. See Steven Labet, Objecting, 16 AM. J. TRiAL ADvoc. 213,220 (1992).
What goes around comes around. The constant invocation of petty objections has a
way of spiraling out of control. Counsel who objects at every turn will eventually find
his own examinations punctuated by the intercessions of the opposing lawyer.
Interchanges with the intent to get back at opposing counsel are not beneficial and can
only detract from the dignity and value of the adversary system.
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3. Conducting the Case from Counsel Table
Although the jurors preferred to allow attorneys the freedom to go on
"walk-abouts" (Table 4), their preference was less pronounced. Many of the
written responses reflected some ambivalence. A common response was, "It
doesn't matter whether they move or not." Those jurors who expressed
stronger views responded with the observation that attorneys should be free to
conduct the case their way and that attorneys are more convincing when they
are more active. A typical juror who strongly preferred the British approach
commented, "The court is not a stage for lawyers to act and influence a
decision with a play or performance."
The more benign reactions of the jurors to limiting advocates' freedom of
movement suggest that the adoption of this British variation would not alienate
jurors. In fact, once again, they may not even be aware of the limitation. The
restriction would likely have an impact on the persuasive ability of the
advocates, 58 but the effect would be equally shared by the prosecution and the
defense. The limitation would certainly improve the decorum of the courtroom
by curbing the opportunity to engage in theatric displays. 59
4. Excusing the Jury While Serious Objections Are Argued to the Court
The fourth British variation tested in the study concerned the handling of
objections. When a serious evidentiary objection is made during a British
criminal trial, 60 the jury is excused while the barristers argue their "point of
law." This particular British approach was one of the least appreciated by the
jurors (Table 4). Most of the written comments made by the jurors who
58 A recent study demonstrated that the lawyer's location in the courtroom does affect
the jury's perception of the advocate's performance. The closer the advocate is to the jury, the
more the advocate's verbal and nonverbal communication are enhanced. See Wolfe, Effect of
Location, supra note 30, at 731. Wolfe also points out that advocates make use of the
opportunity for movement to put on theatric displays and use movement to raise witness
anxiety levels. See id. at 736-37.
The question that must be answered is whether the opportunity for theatrics is more
important to a trial than improving civility. There is an obvious relationship between the
combative nature of "trial by actors" and a decreasing level of civility. After all, "it is a
clich6 among trial lawyers that good trial work is good theater." Janeen Kerper, Stanislavsky
in the Courtroom, 10 LrrG., Summer 1984, at 8.
59 One juror, reacting to the British version of the trial, eloquently commented, "I was
struck by the calmness of the procedure and the clarity of the speakers. No theatrics, no
bombast, no caviling. Dignified, rational, linear. I could follow things easily and never felt
confused or annoyed."60 This is a very rare occurrence.
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disfavored it were similar. For example, jurors commented: "Any objection
made should be known[;] no information placed before the court should be
excused from the jury," and "Once again-we (the jury) were kept in the dark
as to pertinent information to the trial." 61 One of the few jurors who strongly
preferred the British way said, "Fewer interruptions would ensue. Only really
important points would be raised."
Jurors who disliked the British technique of excusing the jury before
discussing serious objections gave the same rationale as the jurors who
disfavored the British way of handling minor objections-jurors should be able
to hear everything that goes on in the courtroom. This rationale, however, is
seriously flawed. It assumes that the purpose of the American criminal trial is to
expose jurors to every bit of evidence relating to the case. In fact, the American
trial is designed to shelter jurors from all kinds of evidence the judge views as
improper for jury consideration. 62 Furthermore, contrary to the jurors'
conjectures, the American procedure for dealing with serious objections
provides the jurors with no more information than the British procedure. Jurors
may be permitted to remain in the courtroom, but watching moving lips at a
"side-bar" conference is no more informative for jurors than spending time in
the jury room "cooling their heels." 63 The dislike of the British approach
expressed in the survey may reflect the same frustration jurors feel about
stopping the trial for side-bar conferences in American trials.64 Consequently,
an adoption by American courts of the British procedure for handling objections
would probably not annoy jurors more than the American approach.
61 Surprisingly, some of the British jurors who viewed the tape had similar opinions: "I
think that juries should know what is going on. Being sent out means that they miss material
that would help them in the verdict."
62 One of the purposes behind all the rules of evidence is to filter out inappropriate
evidence because we don't trust juries. See CHARISopHm B. MuELLER & LARD C.
KIRKPATRCK, EvIDENCE 1 (1995). For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 103(c) addresses
this point: "In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making
statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury." FED. R. Evm.
103(c).
63 In the jury room, at least, jurors could have a bit of tea and attend to other matters.
64 The questionnaire did not ask the jurors who viewed the American version of the trial
to provide their reactions to the interruptions of the trial for side-bar conferences. This
question probably should have been included on the questionnaire.
Furthermore, the phrasing of the question with respect to the jurors' reactions to the
British procedure may have implied that the American approach is more open than it actually
is. It said, "The usual method is that the attorney would raise an objection, which would be
discussed and ruled upon by the judge in open court." The jurors could reasonably infer that
the discussion, not just the judge's ruling, would occur in open court.
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Furthermore, whatever annoyance jurors felt would not affect verdicts (Table
2).
The fact that jurors are frustrated with being excused while objections are
discussed actually supports the argument for adopting the British approach-if
the goal is to enhance the level of civility in the courtroom. 65 Advocates are
always concerned about displeasing jurors. They will think twice before
interjecting marginal objections if one of the consequences of objecting is that
the jury blames them for delaying the trial and keeping the jury in the dark.66
Frivolous objections would become extinct. 67 A significant reduction in the
number of objections, and the wrangling which often follows them, would
certainly improve the decorum of the courtroom.
5. Questioning of Witnesses by the Judge
Of the seven specific procedural differences tested in the study, the judge's
questioning of witnesses was the only British procedure which did not produce
a negative response from the jurors. They were essentially neutral
(approximately 4.0). The written comments support the ambiguity suggested by
the numerical results. The jurors who were strongly skeptical about judicial
intervention believed that "the defense and prosecution should ask questions."
Also, they were concerned about judicial bias, observing that, "the judge
should be unbiased-even though he means well." 68 The jurors who where
65 See JAME W. JEANS, SR., TRIAL ADVOCACY § 16.8 (2d ed. 1993).
In the free wheeling system of American advocacy the objection has assumed a role
far greater than that which it plays in the English system. For our well behaved barrister
brethren an objection is a finely honed instrument utilized for the sole purpose of
excising from the fact finder's attention those bits of information which fall beyond the
pale of proper evidence. Consequently the barristers employ its use with a great deal of
restraint.
Id.
66 See id. at §§ 16-17; RoGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSrENG, TRIAL 153 (1991).
67 A whole list of objections now used in the American courtroom would be curbed.
Such objections might include those used to (1) break the rhythm of an opponent who is "on a
roll"; (2) instruct a witness; (3) instruct the jury; and (4) express outrage. See e.g., JEANS,
supra note 65, at § 16.13-.15; see also THOMAS A. MAUEr, FuNDAMENTAUS OF TRIAL
TECHNIQUEs 287 (1980).
68 See Reitz, supra note 32, at 996.
It is difficult to know how much influence by a judge can be tolerated without impairing
the jury's function. Although we have tended to proscribe judicial activism during jury
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strongly favorable to the idea of the judge asking questions echoed a theme
mentioned in response to previous questions, that "any information that may
make an impact on the case should be brought out."
Although the average of the responses indicates an ambivalence about
judicial questioning, the adoption of this aspect of British procedure may not be
entirely without repercussions. The jurors' responses tended to be polarized,
either very strongly against or strongly in favor. Therefore, a judge who
exercises his or her option to question witnesses may be enhancing the
atmosphere of civility in the courtroom, but may also be alienating a significant
group of jurors. 69
The advantage of a proactive, questioning judge, however, is also apparent.
Advocates have less motivation to use combative and deceptive techniques. 70
For example, a lawyer would hesitate to employ a "smoke and mirrors"
defense if there were a very real prospect that the judge would be the one who
"cleared the air." The possibility of opposing counsel "clearing the air" might
well be regarded by the defense as an acceptable risk. The jury could consider
the opponent's effort at clarification suspiciously, as just a comparable attempt
to sow a different brand of confusion. The deterrent effect would be limited.
There would be deterrence, however, if the judge were asking the clarifying
questions. The jury would assume the judge had an altruistic motive of helping
them understand the facts. Moreover, the jury would be likely to castigate the
advocate who introduced evidence which was so confusing the judge had to
descend from on high to clarify it.71
6. Exclusion of Evidence on the Judge's Own Motion
Once again, the jurors did not favor the British method of controlling the
trial through the judge's interruption of an attorney's question and direction to
the attorney to move on to another area of inquiry (Table 4). The written
comments to this question were reprises of now common themes-advocate
control, potential judicial bias, and the juror's desire to hear every bit of
evidence. Two typical reactions were: "The judge should remain neutral and
should not make his own determination on what should be presented," and "If
trials in order to prevent undue influence on the jury, we may be underrating the
ordinary juror's ability to exercise independent judgment despite judicial influence.
Id.
69 Our study does imply, however, that jury discomfort with judicial questioning will not
affect the verdict.
70 See Reitz, supra note 32, at 993.
71 See GRAHAm, supra note 2, at 238.
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there was a prior similar case, the jury should know." Other jurors were less
concerned about the judge's intervention: "If the evidence should not be
allowed, it shouldn't matter if the attorney objects or not, the judge should stop
it."
As mentioned above, a juror's desire to know everything about a case will
not be gratified by limiting the judge's power to exclude evidence in the
absence of an objection. Inadmissible evidence will be admitted only if no one
objects, an unlikely prospect in an American trial, where the air is usually
permeated with objections.72
The other concerns expressed by the jurors, however, cannot be easily
disregarded. Who should have primary, or even exclusive, control over the
offering of evidence is a fundamental concept that underlies any dispute
resolution system.73 If American jurors are averse to more judicial
prerogatives, such as being more proactive in the exclusion of evidence, then
adoption of this particular British approach could negatively affect the jurors'
impressions of the fairness of the trial. It might also affect the verdict if the jury
believes the judge was lending aid and comfort to one of the parties.
With respect to this variation, perception may be more important than the
reality. In the American trial, the judge normally waits until a lawyer objects
before excluding evidence, but that procedure provides no more protection
against a biased judge than the British procedure. There are many opportunities
for an American judge to put a thumb on the scales of justice, if so inclined. 74
Nevertheless, one should be cautious about changing a tradition which would
cause jurors to question the integrity of the trial.
On the other hand, a proactive judge can reinforce the civility of the trial
by short-stopping in-court arguments of counsel over the admission of
evidence. 75 Proponents will be reluctant to offer questionable evidence if they
know judges may intervene immediately, even before the foundational
questions are posed. The opponents of the evidence are relieved of playing the
72 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 464.
73 See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily &xpanding Role of the American Trial
Judge, 64 VA. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1978).
74 See Patrick E. Longan, Civil Trial Reform and the Appearance of Fairness, 79
MARQ. L. REv. 295, 315-16 (1995); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on
Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 41, 80; Rochelle
L. Shoretz, Let the Record Show: Modifying Appellate Review Procedures for Errors of
Prejudicial Nonverbal Communication by Trial Judges, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1273, 1282-83
(1995).
75 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 437 (arguing that "[tihis greater contentiousness of
American trial lawyers finds its roots in a number of factors, including the passive role of our
judges and the correlative control of lawyers in criminal trials").
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"bad guy" roles (for example the lawyer trying to "hide" relevant evidence) in
front of the jury.76
Not appearing as the "bad guy" is particularly important during opening
statements and closing arguments. 77 Generally, it is unwise to object to an
opponent's opening or close even when opposing counsel's comments are
clearly inappropriate. 78 A judge exercising more proactive control during
openings and closings, however, could enhance the civil atmosphere of the trial
by curbing the more obvious abuses, without the jury labeling opposing counsel
as an obstructionist.79
7. Summing Up of the Case by the Judge
At the close of a British criminal trial the judge summarizes both the facts
and the law for the jury. Of all the variations tested in this study, this variation
is probably the most significant. 80 It is also a variation which did not find favor
with the American jurors (Table 4). Moreover, those who disagreed with the
British approach were strongly opposed. A few of the written comments were:
76 Of course, the proactive judge can only be effective if she is thoroughly
knowledgeable about the case and can anticipate when counsel is crossing into forbidden
evidentiary territory. Much of this prior knowledge can come only from a complete case file
and effective pretrial hearings. These prerequisites exist in England because the trial judge has
a file which includes all the prosecution's evidence and often much of the defendant's.
77 Advocates are probably the most tempted during these phases of the trial to use
uncivil strategies. Their comments are the least fettered by the Rules of Evidence. Moreover,
the "contest" is directly between the advocates and most resembles face-to-face combat.
Frustration levels also rise because one advocate must listen to the other advocate stretch the
limits of "fair comment" without having an effective way to resist the onslaught, except by
adopting comparable tactics when positions are reversed.
7 8 See HAYDOCK & SoNsrENG, supra note 66, at 331; PEr MURRAY, BASIc TRIAL
ADVOCACY 233 (1995); J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PRocFss: LAw, TAcncs AND
Ernucs 173, 405 (1993).
7 9 In an informal March 1996 survey conducted by the Karl D. Kessler Inn of Court in
Montgomery County, Ohio, common pleas judges were asked to list their "pet peeves" with
respect to closing arguments. The most often cited peeves were: misquoting testimony,
screaming, and repetition. All those "pet peeves" could be eliminated if American judges
acted more like their British cousins and curbed the abuses without waiting for an objection.
In the same survey, the judges indicated that they allow attorneys substantial latitude in
closing arguments and discourage objections, thus suggesting that it is their reluctance to
supervise closing arguments that gives rise to their "pet peeves." Materials from Karl D.
Kessler Inn of Court (Mar. 25, 1996) (on file wih the Dayton Bar Association).
80 See Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and
Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118
F.R.D. 161 (1988); see also Rules of Conduct, supra note 34, at 879-87.
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"The judge being an authority figure may sway a person one way or another,"
"Closing arguments should be left to the attorneys," 81 and "He should just
shutup." 82 Two jurors who appreciated the judge's summing up of the evidence
said: "Judges are intelligent; jurors can see them as safe and neutral, someone
they know they can believe," and "The jury forgets things and the judge
reminded them."
The jurors' strong preference that the judge not sum up the evidence might
have been stronger had the jurors also concluded that the summing up by the
judge in State v. Tyler was actually biased (Table 4).83 The jurors viewed the
summation as neutral in tone. Were it otherwise, one would expect their
suspicion of judicial activism would have been even more aroused. 84
The adoption by American courts of this British approach may be the most
problematic. Not only may American jurors suspect judges of trying to
influence the jury's fact-finding process, the reality may be that judges will try
to use the power of factual summation to influence the jury.8 5
81 Some of the British jurors who viewed the American version of the trial had similar
thoughts about the wisdom of the judge summing up the evidence: "The judge's view of the
evidence is not in point as far as the jury is concerned."
It was also interesting that Justice Mantell, the High Court Justice, expressed
reservations about the practice of judges summing up the facts of the case. He observed that,
although summations are supposed to be neutral, judges, without much difficulty, can color
them to favor one side or the other. He also pointed out that having to sum up is a great
burden on the judge, requiring the judge to keep copious notes during the trial and write an
extensive summation. Then, there is the challenge of orally presenting it to the jury in an
interesting way that does not suggest how the judge believes the case should be decided.
82 Some of the jurors' dissatisfaction with the judge's summing up may stem from the
nature of the case. The issues were simple and straight forward, and were tried in less than
two hours. Jurors saw little need for the judge to summarize the evidence. It was fresh in their
minds. They were eager to decide the case and go home. This perspective was reflected in
some comments which labeled the summation "a waste of time."
83 The rating scale on the questionnaire for this question was different than the scale for
most other questions. It asked the jurors to respond to the following statement: "In this case, I
felt that the judge's summary statement was:". The possible responses ranged from "1"
(biased toward the prosecution) to "7" (biased toward the defense). The neutral ranking was
"4."
84 The jurors also strongly disagreed with the statement, "The summary statement
affected my verdict." Of course, one should not be surprised by these results. If jurors saw
the summation as neutral, it is unlikely it would have swayed their verdicts. On the other
hand, if the jurors saw the summation as biased, it is doubtful that they would admit to having
their verdicts influenced by the tainted summation.
857Tere may be a mitigating factor, however. Because some of the jurors objected to
the judge's summation, and because they believed it was unnecessary and a waste of time,
these same jurors may have been more favorably disposed if the case had been complex and
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Unfortunately, the judge's power to sum up might be one of the most
effective means for improving civility in the courtroom. 86 A lawyer's appeal to
jurors' emotions during closing argument would be diluted by the judge taking
additional time for the summing up between the lawyer's closing remarks and
jury deliberation. It is the judge's calm summation that is left "ringing in the
jurors' earS."87 Furthermore, attempts to sidetrack the jury with respect to the
critical issues in the case would be thwarted by the judge's clarification of
important facts. If an advocate does venture during closing to take the jury on a
frolic and a detour, the effort may backfire when the judge's summation points
out the correct route.88
8. The Question Not Asked
It is probably common in empirical studies that after the data is collected
and analyzed the researchers wish they had asked one more question. That is
certainly the case with this study. After digesting the responses to the above
seven questions, we wish jurors had been asked to rank their reactions to the
following statement: "The atmosphere of a typical American criminal trial is
uncivil." The jurors' response to this question would have helped to resolve the
dilemma caused by the study's finding that jurors perceive the British trial as
more civil, but at the same time do not like some of the British procedural
devices that create a more civil atmosphere. If jurors had concluded that the
American criminal trial is "fine" the way it is, then reformers intent on
civilizing the American trial would be wise to pause and reconsider their quest.
lengthy. An unbiased summation of the important facts might have been viewed by these
jurors as helpful.86 See GRAHAM, supra note 2, at 273. "Where used properly, counsel is greatly
encouraged to restrict his advocacy to matters relating to the crucial issues for the jury to
decide. The court can deal with attempts to distort, distract, or confuse fairly in its charge to
the jury." Id.
87 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 487.
The strong comment and summation powers of English judges are used to balance the
defense barrister's opportunity to give the closing argument to which the prosecution
cannot respond. In this country, with our toleration of unrestrained advocacy on the part
of the lawyers, the accused has little protection against the aggressive and emotional
prosecutor during the final and unanswerable argument.
Id.
In the British criminal trial, the prosecuting barrister does not have a right of rebuttal
during final argument. Defense counsel has the last word.
88 See id. at 434.
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If, however, jurors believed the typical American trial is too combative, there
would be more motivation to bring about civilizing changes in the system.
There would be hope that resistance by jurors to British civilizing techniques
could be reduced as the American public became more familiar with those
techniques. In the absence of the unasked question, however, we can only
assume that the American public would prefer a more polite criminal trial.89
In light of the extensive exposure Americans get to criminal trials on
television, it is not surprising that American jurors in the study were more
comfortable with the American way of trying cases, and were skeptical of other
approaches. 90 Litigation is a large part of television entertainment, including
many shows devoted to capturing the action of the courtroom. There is also a
steady diet of actual trials on television. 91 All this exposure builds a cultural
bias toward the American way of conducting criminal trials-the lawyers thrust
and parry while judges referee. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that many
of the jurors who indicated a preference for the American approach were
reflecting this understandable cultural bias,92 as well as their concern about the
unknown. This cultural bias may be an obstacle to modifying the American
criminal trial, but it is not necessarily a roadblock. Despite the jurors'
discomfort with the British way of proceeding, they still felt the trial was as
fairly tried as the American version (Table 3). They also viewed the judge in
the British versions as fairer. Thus the jurors' disfavor of specific procedures is
not so ingrained that jurors are incapable of putting aside their preconceptions
and evaluating the procedural differences on their merits. Otherwise, the jurors
in the study would have found the American trial superior in all respects,
especially with regard to the perceived fairness of the process. The jurors did
not reach such a conclusion, so one can infer that American jurors do not
consider the British trial as inherently unfair, only different. As that difference
is understood, American jurors' resistance to change may ebb.
89 It has been our assumption all along that there is a common desire for reducing the
combativeness of the American trial. There has certainly been frequent commentary by
lawyers and judges about the lack of civility. See supra note 8. The mass media has also
reported the public's negative reaction to the belligerent way some high profile cases have
been tried.
90 See Wolfgang Zeidler, Court Practice and Procedure Under Strain: A Comparison, 8
ADEL. L. REv. 150, 156 (1982).
91 See Nancy Rutter, Lex Popul: Daytime Television Has Discovered the Law, CAL.
LAW., May 1991, at22.
92 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 505. "A fundamental aspect of our individualism
that stands in the way of reforms embracing nonadversary approaches is our antipathy toward
authority: in particular, our fear and distrust of governmental power." Id.
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V. BUMPS ON THE ROAD TO CIVILITY
The primary purpose of this Article was to present the results of our study
to determine how American jurors would react to the perceived greater civility
of the British criminal trial. Our intention was not to provide an extensive
analysis of the specific American trial procedures that would need to be
modified in order to make the American trial more like the British model.
Neither was it our aim to discuss all the possible roadblocks to change posed by
existing statutes, rules, and constitutions. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to
completely ignore those important considerations. Therefore, this Part will
attempt to summarize the modifications of American procedure which would be
required to make the American criminal trial more civil, like the British trial. 93
Furthermore, we will briefly address the trial bar's likely opposition as well as
other legal obstacles to enacting those modifications.
A. Lawyers' and Judges' Resistance to Change
Many American lawyers have an enormous investment in the present
criminal trial system, as combative and uncivil as it may appear. Lawyers who
lament the loss of collegiality rarely are referring to a decline in their own
cooperativeness. It is the pugnaciousness of their opponents which has tarnished
the public's perception of the criminal trial. Their own aggressiveness is
nothing more than good old fashioned advocacy. Moreover, these same
lawyers, for the most part, have flourished in the arena of the American
courtroom. 94 Changes in the American trial which would curtail their brand of
zealous advocacy would, despite the rhetoric to the contrary, be resisted.95
Judges may also prove resistant to modifying the adversarial nature of the
American trial. Although adopting certain civilizing characteristics of the
British system would increase the trial judge's control over the courtroom, 96 the
embracing of those features would also increase the judge's workload. The role
of umpire, which calls only for making rulings when prompted by the
attorneys, is less burdensome than being an attentive and proactive participant
93 The focus will be on those procedural aspects of the British trial which the study
specifically compared to their American analogs (Table 4).
94 Lawyers who do not thrive in the hostile atmosphere of the courtroom tend not to
engage in a legal practice which emphasizes litigation.
95 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 501. "Lawyers have a strong interest in maintaining
the present system, which allows them to be the central figures in the great drama of the
criminal trial. They will not easily yield their power to influence the outcome of trials while
often being regarded as heroes in doing so." Id.
96 A result, one might think, that would be eagerly sought by judges.
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in the proceedings. Activist judges must be thoroughly knowledgeable about the
facts of the case and the applicable law in order to ensure that their energetic
participation in the trial will enlighten rather than confuse jurors.97 Faced with
the prospect of having to immerse themselves in many of the cases on their
overcrowded dockets, judges may opt for less courtroom control and less
civility.
Finally, another structural drag on granting greater power to the trial judge
is the fact that most American judges are elected. 98 Judges are not necessarily
the most learned and impartial members of the legal profession. Many lawyers
regard them as not much more than politicians in robes. Would members of the
trial bar be willing to trust elected judges with more power in order to make the
courtroom a more civil place? Many would prefer dealing with the rogue
advocate than risk the influence of a more powerful rogue judge.
B. Deferral of Defense's Opening Statement
The timing of opening statement by the defense is often governed by
statute. Some states provide that the defendant may open immediately after the
prosecution's opening. Others require that the defense defer opening until the
prosecution has completed its case-in-chief. Many states give the defendant the
option to open immediately after the prosecution's opening or defer opening
until the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief. Finally, some jurisdictions,
including the federal courts, have no statute specifying when the defense
opening may be given.99 It is clear, however, that the defense does not have a
constitutional right to make an opening statement immediately following the
prosecution's opening statement, and the trial judge has much discretion as to
the timing of opening statements. 1°°
97 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 503; Frankel, supra note 8, at 1042.
98 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 519-20.
99 See James R. Lucas, Opening Statement, 13 U. HAw. L. REv. 349, 377 n.41 (1991).
1oo See, e.g., U.S. v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1983). In Salovitz, the court
said: "We hold, however, that a defendant's unfettered right to make an opening statement,
unlike his right to a closing argument, is not one of the 'traditions of the adversary fact finding
process that has been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.'" Id.
(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975)); see also Hugo L. Black Jr.,
Opening Statement, in Litigation 1987, at 712 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 340, 1987); Lucas, supra note 99, at 357-58.
Although there is consensus that in the absence of a statutory mandate the judge has
unfettered discretion in determining the timing of the opening statements, there is some
authority that trial judges may not eliminate opening statements entirely. See, e.g., U.S. v.
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In those states where statutory law dictates the timing of opening statements
or allows the defendant to choose when to open, any attempt to adopt the
British approach of delaying the defense's opening statement would require
amending the statutes. No statutory amendments would be required in those
jurisdictions which already delay the defense's opening until the close of the
prosecution's case-in-chief, or give the trial judge complete discretion as to the
timing of opening statements.
Although the statutory and constitutional barriers to change are modest,
significant cultural hurdles must be cleared before courts would require
defendants to defer their opening statements. The defense bar would strongly
resist the modification. The common opinion among advocates is that delaying
opening statement is usually a big tactical mistake.101 They maintain that not
presenting the defendant's story as soon as possible seriously undermines the
defendant's chances for an acquittal. 102
In light of the numerous, and large, hurdles in the road to adopting the
British procedure of delaying the defendant's opening statement, would the
benefits of adoption (increased civility) justify the effort? Probably not. It is
difficult to determine if a delayed defense plays much of a role in improving the
civil atmosphere of the courtroom. The impact is marginal at best. Therefore, it
is unlikely that this particular British procedural device could be grafted to the
American criminal trial, and would be perhaps unwise to try.
C. Resolution of Minor Evidentiary Issues Without Objections
This aspect of British courtroom practice could be adopted in American
courtrooms without changing any substantive or procedural laws. There are no
procedural or evidentiary rules which forbid advocates from talking with each
other during a trial when the conversation occurs outside of the hearing of the
judge and jury. Neither are there rules which prohibit counsel from passing
written notes to each other. There are rules of professional conduct, however,
which limit the extent advocates can address each other in open court. For
example, "A lawyer should not engage in acrimonious conversations or
Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1975); Hampton v. U.S., 269 A.2d 441, 443 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
101 See, e.g., HAYDOCK, supra note 66, at 297; JEANS, supra note 65, at §10.19; SAUL
M. KASSN & LAWRENCE S. WRwGnrsMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 106 (1988);
TANFORD, supra note 78, at 170; Black, supra note 100, at 725; Tom Riley, The Opening
Statement: Wmning at the Outset, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 81, 86 (1987).
102 As mentioned previously, empirical studies appear to support this perception. See
supra note 53.
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exchanges involving personalities with opposing counsel. Objections, requests
and observations should be addressed to the court." 103
These code provisions are meant to curb courtroom exchanges between
advocates, which could easily degenerate into unseemly squabbles. Requiring
counsel to address any open-court comments to the judge removes the
temptation to score points by lacing one's remarks with sharp barbs aimed at
opposing counsel. Encouraging counsel to speak and cooperate with each other
outside the hearing of the judge and jury would not violate either the letter or
the spirit of the codes of conduct. 104
The biggest obstacle to encouraging attorneys to resolve some evidentiary
objections without seeking the intervention of the court is the American
courtroom culture. It flies in the face of all our adversarial training and
instincts.10 5 We often perceive too much cooperation by opposing counsel in
the courtroom as a sign of weakness, or alternatively, as a stratagem designed
to lull us into a false sense of security. Even judges may take offense with
attorneys engaging in t~te-A-ttes at counsel table. 106
Attempts to adopt the British style of dealing with minor objections may be
more traumatic to American attorneys than the adoption of any other British
procedural device discussed in this Article.1o7 It would require attorneys to
cultivate a degree of trust in opposing lawyers that is rarely exhibited in an
American courtroom. Trial advocates would have to be convinced that
103 Ameican College of Trial Lawyers Code of Trial Conduct, 156 F.R.D. 275, at 289
(1994); see also U.S. D.R. D. UTAH, GEN. R. 111; U.S. D.R. M.D. TENN., R. 12; U.S.
DIsr. Cr. R. E.D. OKL., R. 30; U.S. BANKR. Cr. R. D. Wyo., R. 917; CAIFOIIA
PRACnCE GUIDE, CIviL TRIALS AND EviDENCE § 4:210 (1995).
104 Both the codes and the British approach encourage civility between the advocates.
The codes encourage open-court dialogues that are less combative, and the British approach
encourages cooperation between counsel, which may actually reduce the need for open-court
dialogues, where there is always the temptation to engage in repartee.
105 See Lubet, supra note 57, at 239.
No matter how foolish, trite, or easily disposed of the other side's position seems,
an attorney must avoid speaking directly to opposing counsel. All arguments should
be directed to the court. If, in the course of an argument, an attorney is ever
tempted to turn to opposing counsel, he should remember that opposing counsel is
being paid to disagree with him.
Id.; see also HAYDOCK, supra note 66, at 162; JEANs, supra note 65, at 465; TANFORD,
supra note 78, at 190-93; D. Brooks Smith, The Art and Etiquette of Stating Objections, 16
PA. LAW. 18, 22 (1994).
106 See Clarke, supra note 8, at 993.107 See supra note 65.
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cooperation and accommodation would not make them dupes and lessen their
chances for favorable verdicts. They would have to become confident that less
scrupulous lawyers would not take advantage of the opportunity to raise quiet
objections as a new way to disrupt the flow of an opponent's case without direct
judicial supervision.
D. Conducting the Case from Counsel Table
American courts could literally adopt the British custom of "fixing"
advocates to counsel table tomorrow. Trial judges have practically unfettered
discretion in controlling where lawyers must stand or sit while examining
witnesses, conducting opening statements, and making closing arguments.
10 8
Many judges already require attorneys to address the court and the jury from a
podium.
The resistance to this change will come most forcefully from trial attorneys.
They are well-schooled in how to position themselves in the courtroom to
enhance their persuasive powers. It is an article of faith that an advocate would
be foolish not to take advantage of a judge's permission to move freely during
the course of a trial.10 9
Of course, it is the connection between movement and theatrics which is
also the strongest argument for adopting the British approach. The temptation to
"act out" is more irresistible the more freedom an advocate is given to "stage"
his interrogations of witnesses and remarks to the jury. It is all too easy to stray
from intense advocacy to theatrical antics. The restricting of lawyers to counsel
table, masked by a podium, would remove that temptation. 110
108 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 611 gives the judge broad powers with
respect to the mode and order of interrogation and presentation. See FED. R. EviD. 611; see
also STEVEN H. GOLDBERG, THE FIRSr TRIAL: WHERE Do I Srr? WHAT Do I SAY? 17-59
(1982); TANFORD, supra note 78, at 403-04; Wolfe, Toward a Unified Theory, supra note
30, at 606 n.43.
109 See, e.g., GOLDBERG, supra note 108, at 44-46; MAUEr, supra note 67, at 97;
Wolfe, Effect of Location, supra note 30, at 774-75.
110 One practical, logistical problem with requiring lawyers to remain at counsel table is
the need for a bailiff or usher to remain in the courtroom at all times. In many American
trials, the attorneys themselves have exhibits marked for identification and hand them to the
witnesses. If attorneys are not free to move or approach the witness, then bailiffs must convey
exhibits from counsel table to the court reporter and the witness.
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E. Excusing the Jury While Serious Objections Are Argued to the Court
American trial judges already have complete discretion to handle objections
that require counsel to elaborate the grounds for the objection."' The judge
may permit counsel to engage in some sparring over objections within the
hearing of the jury, hold "side-bar" conferences, or excuse the jury while the
attorneys argue.11 2 Therefore, an American judge could easily make it common
practice to excuse the jury while attorneys argue objections, without fear of
being reversed by the court of appeals.
The greatest impediment to adopting the British approach would be the
opposition of trial lawyers, and perhaps to a lesser extent, the judges
themselves. Attorneys would have to be much more careful about making
objections or else risk alienating the jury.113 They would be forced to
distinguish between crucial objections and insignificant objections, not always
an easy analytical task. Furthermore, attorneys would fear that opposing
counsel would take advantage of their hesitation to object by proffering more
objectionable evidence." 4 Judges might resist the British approach of excusing
the jury while objections are argued because moving jurors in and out of the
jury box would be "cumbersome and time consuming." 115
111 See Lubet, supra note 57, at 237-38.
As an initial matter, an attorney usually argues objections from wherever he
happens to be standing or sitting when the issue first arises.... [In most circumstances,
it does no harm to have the discussion in the presence of the jury. Occasionally,
however, the jury should not hear the content of the argument.
Id.
112 For example, Federal Rules of Evidence 104 and 611 give the judge extensive
powers to allow jurors to hear evidentiary arguments and preliminary hearings, or to prevent
them from hearing such matters. See FED. R. EViD. 104 advisory committee's note: "Much
evidence on preliminary questions, though not relevant to jury issues, may be heard by the
jury with no adverse effect. A great deal must be left to the discretion of the judge who will
act as the interests of justice require." Id; see also Lubet, supra note 57, at 238.
113 See supra Part IV.D.4.
114 The possibility of adversaries being cut loose to offer inadmissible evidence
emphasizes the need to adopt the complimentary British procedure that encourages the judge
to limit objectionable evidence without first requiring counsel to object.
115 Lubet, supra note 57, at 238. Excusing the jury before arguments are presented on
objections would not necessarily be inefficient. If the judge alerts counsel before the trial
about the procedure that will be followed, fewer objections will be made. Fewer objections,
including those requiring side-bar conferences, may actually result in a shorter, and more
civil, trial.
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F. Questioning of Witnesses by the Judge
It is common for judges to have the authority to question witnesses. 116
Judges, however, must be careful when acting on this authority. 117 When it
comes to questioning witnesses, the American judge is more likely to be
reticent than interrogative. 118 Champions of the "less questioning by judges the
better" school have argued that judicial questioning may create more confusion
than clarity. 119 They are also concerned that the judge may display a bias
toward one party or the other by actively questioning witnesses.
120
Furthermore, judicial interrogation may dilute the adversarial strengths of both
parties' cases by undermining their trial strategies.' 2 1
Supporters of a more proactive questioning role for judges rue the tradition
of American judges, who rest quietly on the sideline. 122 Some appellate courts,
especially federal ones, have not hindered trial judges who actively participate
in trials by asking questions. 123 Trial judges may question witnesses, but they
116 "The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." FED.
R. EviD. 614(b). "The authority of the judge to question witnesses is also well established."
FED. R. Evm. 614 advisory committee's note; see also MW.LLEm & KRKPATRICK, supra
note 62, at 544.
117 See U.S. v. Auten, 570 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1978). Some state rules of
evidence specifically warn judges about the limitation on their right to question witnesses.
See, e.g., MONT. R. EviD. 614; N.M. R. EvID. 614; WASH. R. EvD. 614.
118 "Moreover, experienced trial judges have championed the view that our adversarial
system gives little room for trial judges' questioning of witnesses." U.S. v. Filani, 74 F.3d
378, 384 (2d Cir. 1996); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 8 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992).
119 Judge Frankel doubted the efficacy of the questioning of witnesses by judges.
His intrusions will in too many cases result from partial or skewed insights. He may
expose the secrets one side chooses to keep while never becoming aware of the other's.
He runs a good chance of pursuing inspirations that better informed counsel have
considered, explored, and abandoned after fuller study.
Frankel, supra note 8, at 1042.
120 See Saltzburg, supra note 73, at 16-21; Peter David Blanck, et al., Note, The
Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Cniinal Jury Trials, 38
STAN. L. REv. 89, 94 (1985).
121 See Saltzburg, supra note 73, at 55; see also Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 530.
122Wigmore fumed about "the abject surrender of the trial judge's
function... repulsive in its misguided supineness." 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 784, at 190
n.2 (2d ed. Chadbourne Rev. 1992).
123 The Second Circuit, in Filani, 74 F.3d at 384-85, stated,
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must avoid any appearance of partiality or hostility to one side. 124 Judges must
be particularly circumspect when questioning defendants because their
interrogation is more likely to be interpreted by the jury as hostility or disbelief
of the defendant.1 25 Nevertheless, the judge's intervention may be helpful when
counsel's examination is inadequate or when witnesses are nervous,
inarticulate, or less than candid. 126
The statutory law at both the state and federal level would not prevent a
trial judge from questioning witnesses, although the common law in the states
may be more restrictive. 127 One could anticipate, however, considerable
resistance by trial attorneys to an increase in judicial questioning. Our
traditional distrust of authority and our system of electing judges would cause
many lawyers to recoil at the prospect of American judges assuming more
active control of a trial.12s Furthermore, what trial lawyer would ever concede
that a trial judge could improve on his or her handling of a case?129
Some judges might also resist taking on more responsibility for examining
witnesses. Such duty would add to the judicial workload by requiring judges to
become much more immersed in the facts of the case and compelling them to
guess about possible strategies counsel might pursue.' 30 Even with more study,
From our earliest days this Circuit has adopted a carefully balanced role for the
trial judge. Our court has never embraced the so-called sporting theory of the common
law. This extreme theory viewed litigation as a game of skill and placed the trial judge in
the position of an umpire, there simply to see that the rules of the game were obeyed.
See 3 WIGMORE, EviDNcE § 784. We have rejected such a limited role because a trial
judge's duty to see the law correctly administered cannot be properly discharged if the
judge remains inert. See United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d. 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945)
(L. Hand, J.).
Instead, the trial court may actively participate and give its own impressions of the
evidence or question witnesses.
Id.; see also, e.g., U.S. v. Holmes, 794 F.2d 345, 349 (8th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Jackson, 696
F.2d 578, 593 (8th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1979).
124 See, e.g., Rogers v. U.S., 609 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1979).
125 See, e.g., State v. Prokos, 631 N.E.2d 684 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (presenting case in
which the judge asked 33 questions of the defendant).
126 See, e.g., Jackson v. U.S., 329 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
12 7 See MUEMLER & KmRKPATRICK, supra note 62, at 544.
128 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 507, 533.
12 9 See Reitz, sWpra note 32, at 995.
130 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 503.
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many American judges would be concerned that their active involvement might
yield more smoke than light. 131
Unlike the adoption of other aspects of the British system which would
require cooperation on the part of American counsel, 132 more active judicial
questioning could occur if American judges decide, on an individual basis, to
"just do it." Moreover, judges could become more proactive gradually by
asking only a few clarifying questions at first, thus easing themselves and
lawyers into their new, more British-like roles.
G. Exclusion of Evidence on the Judge's Own Motion
It is clear that an American judge does not need to wait for one of the
lawyers to object before intervening and excluding evidence. Federal Rule of
Evidence 611, and similar state rules, give the trial judge wide discretion in
controlling the presentation of evidence. 133 The limitations on this power are
basically the same as those discussed in the preceding section. Judges should
not use the power to exclude evidence without objection in such a way as to
suggest they favor one side over the other. The resistance on the part of
American attorneys to this form of judicial activism springs from the same
ground as their opposition to free questioning of witnesses by judges, their
distrust of authority, and loss of control. In addition, the reasons attorneys do
not object to what may be objectionable evidence are often closely tied to their
overall strategy for the case, a strategy that could easily be thwarted if judges
"graciously" exclude the evidence on their own motion. 134
As with questioning witnesses, American judges could act more like British
judges tomorrow. They could exclude evidence without first waiting for an
131 See Frankel, supra note 8, at 1042.
132 For example, attorneys would resolve minor evidentiary issues without objection.
133 See WmsENBERGER, FEDERAL EvDENcE, § 611.1 (2d ed. 1995).
Rule 611(a) gives the trial court authority to control the interrogation of witnesses
and the presentation of evidence. In the exercise of its discretion, the trial court is
guided by three generalized principles, any or all of which may serve as the basis
for the court's decision: (i) efficient ascertainment of truth; (ii) avoidance of
needless consumption of time; and (iii) protection of witnesses from harassment or
undue embarrassment.
Id.
134 See Lubet, supra note 57, at 220.
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objection and not violate any statutory or common law restrictions. The change,
however, could be traumatic for trial attorneys if not done gradually.1 35
H. Summing Up of the Cases by the Judge
The adoption of the British practice of the trial judge summing up the
evidence probably faces more procedural and attitudinal roadblocks than any of
the seven variations examined in this study, with the possible exception of
defense counsel's deferral of the opening statement until the close of the
prosecution's case-in-chief. In the federal courts, the judge ostensibly has the
power to both "sum up" and "comment" 136 on the evidence, but the reality is
that federal judges rarely do either. 137
In 1933, the Supreme Court, in Quercia v. United States,138 established the
limits for commenting on the evidence for the federal courts. The Court held
that the trial judge, when charging the jury, was not limited to abstract
instructions, but could comment on the evidence by emphasizing points the
judge believed important, and could even express an opinion if it was made
clear to the jury that it was an opinion which the jury was free to disregard.139
The power to comment was not unlimited, however. The judge could not
assume the role of a witness or distort the evidence. 140 Surprisingly, after this
rather sweeping grant of authority, the Court then appeared to issue a stem
caution about using it.
The influence of the trial judge on the jury is "necessarily and properly of great
weight" and "his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and
135 Any judge contemplating taking a more proactive role by questioning witnesses
should probably warn counsel in advance of her intent. That notice should prevent attorneys
from going into cardiac arrest when the judge improves on an examination or excludes
evidence without objection.
136 There is a difference between "summing up" and "commenting" on the' evidence,
but the difference is more of degree than type. Summing up consists of the judge reviewing
the evidence before the jury in a capsulized form; when commenting, the judge provides a
more in-depth analysis, including guidance to the jury on how to evaluate credibility. See
Weinstein, supra note 80, at 168.
137 "In America, we have since moved away from this practice, although under our
federal system judges are permitted to both summarize and comment. Very few of us accept
that challenge. Instead, the charge we give to the jury is limited strictly to the law." Rules qf
Conduct, supra note 34, at 884; see EDwARD J. DEVrIr Er AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACICE
AND INSTRUcnONS, § 8.04 (4th ed. 1992); Weinstein, supra note 80, at 169.
138 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
139 See id. at 469.
140 See id. at 470.
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may prove controlling." This court has accordingly emphasized the duty of the
trial judge to use great care that an expression of opinion upon the evidence
"should be so given as not to mislead, and especially that it should not be one-
sided"; that "deductions and theories not warranted by the evidence should be
studiously avoided." 14
1
This ambiguity about the judge's power to sum up the evidence was obvious in
1972 when the Supreme Court proposed Rule of Evidence 105. The Rule
would have codified the judge's common law power to sum up and comment
on the evidence. Congress refused to adopt it. 142
The aura of uncertainty which obscures the legitimacy of judicial comment
is probably one of the reasons most judges do not even attempt to sum up the
evidence. 14 3 When in doubt, the advice is "don't." 14 4 Respected commentators
like Stephen Saltzburg strongly oppose the judge's use of the power to
comment. 145 He argues that it is almost impossible for a judge to sum up or
comment on the evidence without lending weight to one side or the other.146
Trial judges do not relish being reversed by courts of appeal, so the risk of
summing up and providing the defendant with more grist for the appellate mill
is greater than the dubious benefit of helping the jury wrestle with the facts. 147
141 Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
142 See Saltzburg, supra note 73, at 23.
143 See John W. Baker, Note, United States v. Anton: The Rights of a Federal Judge to
Comment to the Jury, 9 CAP. U. L. REv. 161, 161 (1980).
[The judge's] influence on the jury is inevitably significant[;] he must exercise care so as
not to impinge upon the defendant's constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence
determined by his peers. The line of demarcation, however, between what a judge may
or may not say has never been adequately established. Consequently, the modem day
trial judge risks reversible error with every observation he makes.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 431.
144 "[lit is far better for the trial judge to err on the side of obstention [sic] from
intervention in the case rather than on the side of active participation in it.... " Blumberg v.
U.S., 222 F.2d 496, 501 (5th Cir. 1955).
145 "The judicial powers of summation and comment interfere as much with the
adversary system as they do with the right to a jury trial." Saltzburg, supra note 73, at
43. "The presumption of neutrality, combined with the timing of the judge's comments and the
inability of the parties to rebut his opinions, render the judge's summation or comment a
powerful influence on the jury." Id. at 44.
146 See id. at 41-42.
147 "It has been suggested that the power [to comment] is being more closely confined in
recent cases and that the appellate courts look upon comments with closer scrutiny." DEvrrr,
supra note 137, § 8.04, at 251; see also Saltzberg, supra note 73, at 34. "Judges who become
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At the state level, the legal roadblocks to adopting the British summing up
procedure are even higher. Many states prohibit both summarizing and
commenting on the evidence. Other states allow judges to comment but put
stringent limitations on their ability to stray from a bland recitation of
uncontroverted facts and boiler-plate instructions on the law. 148
Most trial lawyers, and many trial judges, are likely to resist increasing the
courts' power to comment with a revolutionary tenacity. There is extensive
skepticism about the prospect of a judge being able to put aside her own bias in
a case and provide the jury with a neutral summary of the facts. 149 Attorneys
also would not relish the possibility of their cogent, persuasive final arguments
being diluted by lengthy judicial soliloquies that attempt to sum up the
evidence. 150 Finally, lawyers may object to the judge's description of a
witness's testimony and not have effective means to challenge that perspective.
There is no chance to "add just a few more words," and to object to the judge's
comments in front of the jury would be risky. 151
Judges may also believe that a truly neutral summation is not possible, and
therefore would be reluctant to sum up British style. Moreover, judges might
demur to the extra work required to adequately sum up. 152 The British judge,
for example, must be constantly attentive to the testimony and keep copious
notes in order to prepare a summation. 153 It could also be a struggle, and time-
consuming, for the judge to formulate a facially neutral summary of the
evidence, one that does not omit important facts and establishes an impartial
tone. 154 Finally, judges may fear that the inclusion of a judicial summation
would considerably lengthen the trial. The pace of testimony would be slowed
overly aggressive in managing or directing important elements of lawsuits in their courts will
be reversed on appeal." Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to
Adversary Justice?, 21 CREIGHTON L. REv. 801, 806 (1987-88).
148 See Saltzburg, supra note 73, at 23; Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 430; Weinstein,
supra note 80, at 168.
149 See Saltzburg, supra note 73, at 35-36.
150 See id. at 38.
151 See id. at 44; Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 524.
152 Somewhat surprisingly, Justice Mantell had mixed feelings about the efficacy of
summing up the facts. He agreed that giving a proper summation was one of the most difficult
duties a British judge must tackle. See supra note 24.
153 See Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 524. See generally Rules of Conduct, supra note
34.
154 One can imagine a trial judge trying to proof a draft of her summary in order to
produce a neutral summation while trying to anticipate how the court of appeals will view her
words with its 20/20 hindsight.
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to the speed of the judge's notetaking, and additional time would be necessary
for the judge to deliver her summation to the jury.155
American courts face large barriers to incorporating judicial summaries of
the evidence. Although federal judges presumably have the power to
summarize and comment on the evidence, the limits put on the power by courts
of appeal are a strong deterrent to adoption of the British approach. Most state
court judges do not even have the power to sum up the evidence. Moreover,
trial lawyers would be strongly opposed to judges using their summation
powers even if the result were a more civil trial.15 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The results of this study show that jurors considered a criminal trial more
civil when the trial procedure included certain civilizing features that are
common to the British criminal trial. The jurors also believed the British-style
trial to be as fair as the American version, and the jurors' verdicts for both
versions, when conducted by the same attorneys and judge, were the same.
Therefore, the study demonstrated that a more civil trial does not seem to
benefit either the prosecution or the defense.
Nevertheless, at the same time the jurors were concluding that the British
version was more civil, and as fair as, the American trial, they also expressed a
dislike for those procedural variations which actually make the British criminal
trial more civil. Some of the jurors' uneasiness can be attributed to being more
comfortable with familiar American trial procedures, but some of their aversion
probably does stem, in part, from more fundamental philosophical principles.
American jurors are suspicious of judicial authority and are skeptical of
increasing the power of the judge. Additionally, many of the jurors in the study
believed it is the primary function of the attorneys to orchestrate the trial and
would hesitate to shift that responsibility.
In short, this study does suggest a possible procedural route for reaching
the goal of a more civil criminal trial, a route that our British brethren have
been navigating for years. Furthermore, American courts would not need to
effect a major change in their procedural rules to explore the British road. It is
only necessary to possess the resolution to try a different path. It remains to be
seen, however, if the legal community's, and society's, apparent disgust with
155 It is not unusual for a British judge to advise counsel at the beginning of a trial to
"watch my hand," which means, "don't ask questions faster than I can take notes." See also
Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 524.
156 In jurisdictions where the judge has authority to sum up, some experimentation is
possible, but it is highly probable that the summations will typically be appealed and often
lead to reversals.
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combative American trials is sufficient to overcome our natural reluctance to
change. 157
15 7 We soon hope to test the legal community's resolve in Montgomery County, Ohio.
Our hope is to obtain the cooperation of judges, prosecuting attorneys, and defense attorneys
in adopting some aspects of the British trial in actual criminal cases. Then we would measure
juror reaction to the civilizing variations and determine what impact, if any, the variations had
on verdicts.
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of Sample (N=219)
Age 18-30 136
31-40 27
41-50 27
51-60 15
61-70 14
Sex Male 64
Female 155
Race White 176
African-American 32
Asian 4
Hispanic 5
Other 2
Political Affiliation Democrat 84
Republican 67
Independent 50
Other 10
Political Orientation Conservative 53
Middle of the Road 107
Liberal 52
Education Some High School 4
High School Graduate 14
Some College 152
College Graduate 17
Some Graduate School 12
Graduate Degree 20
Occupation Full-time Student 105
Employed 99
Housewife 6
Not employed/retired 9
Table 2
Verdict by Type of Trial
American British/British British/American Total
Guilty 35 55 127 1117
Not Guilty 43 25 34 102
Total 78 80 61 219
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Table 3
Mean Perceptions of Trial and Trial Participants
NOTE: Asterisk denotes mean significantly differs from others.
Trial Overall American British/British British/American
(1 =strongly agree; 7= strongly disagree)
Fairly tried (NS) 2.65 2.61 2.60
Civil in 4.41* 3.16 3.24
tone/atmosphere
(F=10.66, p<.001)
Too many 4.65* 5.85 5.31
interrupts/objections
(F=10.79, p<.001)
Prosecutor
(1 =not at all effective; 7=very effective)
Opening argument 4.99 5.09 4.72
(NS)
Questioning victim 5.10 5.12 5.16
(NS)
Questioning Bob 4.65 5.25 4.72
(F=4.51, p<.01)
Questioning Doctor 4.14 4.99* 4.15
(F=5.55, p<.005)
Questioning Defendant 4.84 5.62* 4.93
(F=5.81, p< .003)
Closing argument 4.82 5.39* 4.80
(F=3.84, p<.02 )
Overall performance 4.35 5.41* 4.88
(F=5.98, p<.003) I I _I
(1 = strongly agree; 7 =strongly disagree)
Prosecutor likeable 2.95 2.84 3.12
(NS)
Prosecutor 3.25 2.58* 3.34
knowledgeable
(F=5.17, p<.006)
Prosecutor strong 3.23 2.77 2.91
advocate (NS)
Prosecutor antagonistic 4.13 4.53 4.54
(NS)
Prosecutor persuasive 3.69 3.19 3.74
(NS) I I I
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Table 3 (cont'd)
Defense Attorney American British/British British/American
(1=not at all effective; 7=very effective)
Opening argument 4.55 4.46 4.51
(NS)
Questioning victim 4.88 4.69 4.25(NS)
Questioning Bob (NS) 4.82 4.49 4.25
Questioning Doctor 4.68 4.79 4.26
(NS)
Questioning Defendant 5.32 4.97 5.13
(NS)
Closing argument (NS) 4.92 4.32 4.89
Overall performance 5.01 4.66 4.74
(NS)
(1 =strongly agree; 7=strongly disagree)
Defense attorney 3.87 3.90 3.84
likeable (NS)
Defense attorney 3.29 3.16 3.05
knowledgeable (NS)
Defense attorney 2.76 3.28* 2.48
strong advocate
(F=4.04, p<.02)
Defense attorney 3.55 3.95 3.46
antagonistic (NS) I
Defense attorney 3.28 3.74 3.28
persuasive (NS) I I I
(1=strongly agree; 7=strongly disagree)
Judge
Judge fair 3.30* 2.65 2.84
(F=3.64, p<.03)
Judge authoritative 3.59* 2.60 2.64
(F=4.80, p<.Ol)
Judge knowledgeable 3.38* 2.70 2.68
(F=3.82, p <.02 )
Judge likeable 3.42* 2.88 2.72
(F=4.62, p <.01)
Judge effective overall 3.27* 2.62 2.61
(F=3.21, p<.04)
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Table 4
Opinions on Trial Variations
Subjects in each trial version were asked whether they preferred the variation they
received over the alternative variation (for discussion of variations, see text). Scale is 1-
7, with 1 referring to a preference for the variation received.
NOTE: Asterisk denotes mean significantly differs from others.
American British/British British/American
Placement of opening 2.66* 4.25 4.81
statement
Handling of minor 2.49* 4.48 5.44
objections
Movement of attorneys 2.81* 3.91 3.93
Handling of serious 2.77* 4.48 4.98
objections
Questioning of 3.99 3.88 4.19
witnesses by the judge
(NS)
Judicial intervention to 3.56* 4.55 4.47
exclude evidence
Summing up of case by 3.23* 4.91 5.12
the judge
Summary statement X 3.99 4.54
was biased (NS)
Summary statement X 5.44 5.05
affected my verdict
(NS)
p<.05
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